Talking about Social Class: Are the Economic Interests of the Majority of Americans with the Democratic Party?

 

By Steve Rose

 

Most of the post-mortems discussing the meaning of Bush’s electoral victory and the alternatives facing the Democratic Party have an implicit definition of social class based on economic interests embedded in their analyses. Since the Republican policies over the last 25 years have favored the rich and appealed to cultural conservatives, then ‘how do they keep winning?’ is a conundrum for progressives. Some commentators resolve this problem by arguing that many people do not vote their interests but respond to cultural/social concerns instead (e.g., Thomas Frank’s book What’s the Matter with Kansas: How Conservatives Won the Heart of America[1]). Garance Franke-Ruta cites a wealth of social science research showing that economic self-interest is a poor predictor of voting behavior (implicitly agreeing with the premise that that most people’s economic self-interest is to vote Democratic).[2] Harold Meyerson plaintively asks: “How do the Democrats win back the allegiance of the white working class?” (Washington Post, March 23, 2005).

 

In this picture, Republicans are savvy and effectively obfuscate their positions while the Democrats are relatively inept with poor candidates unable to build on their strengths. Or, Judas and Teixeira redefine success and say that the Democrats did relatively well in 2004, given the facts of incumbency and high concern for national security.[3] Sticking to their prediction of an emerging Democratic majority, they show Democratic electoral strength among minorities, those with college degrees, and the young.

 

In all this discussion, it is tacitly assumed that the majority of people have a natural home in the non-Republican party.[4] The failure of the Democrats to capitalize on this advantage is explained in several ways. First, they are accused of having sold their souls in order to attract campaign contributions. Second, the press is biased and does not report the true effect of Republican policies. Third, the inside-the-Beltway mentality of Democratic campaign consultants has blinded them to obvious appeal of a populist approach.[5]

 

Perhaps, we need to consider the alternative that the majority of people do not have basic economic interests to vote Democratic. While there have been many presentations on how people vote by education, income, and occupation, few have made careful arguments about what each division means in terms of tying interests to politics. For example, some have defined those without a four-year college degree as being working class and presumably with interests to support Democrats. To date, the discussion about defining economic interests is similar to the one defining pornography—hard to put into words but you know it when you see it. With respect to pornography, the courts have turned to community standards in deciding specific cases. We need to do at least as much in defining interests in order to make good strategic decisions.

 

It is an occupational hazard of those with big hearts to overestimate the share of the population that is economically distressed. In their desire to generate public attention and support to expand public policies, they argue that the system is “broken” and needs repair (e.g., candidate Edwards’ speeches about the two Americas). But, it makes a big difference whether the share of the population in need is 15, 35, or 50 percent. If it is at the high end of the range, then one would expect lots of pressure from below to meet their needs. But if it is at the low end of the range, then poor people will need allies among those who think it is morally right to take care of others in need.

 

Thus, it is an empirical question to determine the exact contours of America’s current social class structure. Because the data can be organized in so many different ways, it is quite easy to selectively use different series and approaches to argue for a number of different points of view. Another difficulty is that most information is based on a single year snapshot, and it is possible that those who are poor today will be well-off in the future. While conservative researchers tend to overestimate the amount of mobility, it is true that long-run analyses present a different picture than the ones based on a single year.[6]

 

Defining Progressive Economic Interests

 

The syllogism--the Republicans are the party of business, the Democrats are the party of workers, and, since most people are workers, therefore the majority of people should be Democrats—is what many activists feel in their gut. From Roosevelt’s initial victory in 1932 to Johnson’s victory in 1964, it seemed true. Since then, the Republicans have won seven out of ten of the presidential elections and broke the long reign of Democratic control over the House of Representatives. Despite a hyper-energized Democratic base, Bush’s won a higher share of the votes in 2004 than he won in 2000. For those who did not believe in the far-fetched theories that the election was rigged, this was a bitter pill to swallow and has led to another round of intra-party squabbles.

 

 There are lots of reasons to support public policies that help those at bottom. But, if we are trying to specify interests rather than broad concerns for social solidarity, we need to more selective in determining which policies directly and materially assist different sectors of the population. In particular, we must evaluate the Democratic Party’s claim to speak for the middle as well as the lower classes.

 

In America today, the vast majority of people consider themselves as part of the middle class, sometimes adding the adjective “upper” or “lower.” This group contains a huge swatch of the population from just above the poverty line to those making over $150,000. While people in households who consistently make over $100,000 might define themselves as solidly middle class and worried about their future, it would not be appropriate to include all of these people as having a clear interest to be in the Democratic camp.  On the other hand, we would not want to limit any interest-based definition to those earning the minimum wage or living in a family with an income below the poverty.[7] Many commentators think that this is a ridiculously low number ($16,000 for a family of three), and many polls show that a majority of people would choose a figure of at least $25,-35,000 as the amount needed to minimally get by.

 

In general, progressive social policies have limited the unfettered competition between social groups and can be grouped in two categories. In the first group, there are government safety net programs that provide shelter, food, money, and services (especially medical) for the needy. The second set of policies involve public limits to private business power that change the terms of the interaction of workers and bosses and constrain activities that may be harmful to society (e.g., environmental regulation).

 

So which groups have strong interests in these two types of policies? To do this, we need to address five questions:

 

1. How much income do people have who use safety net programs?
2. What about people just above this cut-off?
3. How many people fall into these categories?
4. What kinds of people benefit from power-limiting rules?
5. What is the impact of retirement and other government programs?

 

One caveat--in none of the cases are the definitions absolutely clear. The purpose here is to start an open discussion on these issues and to present estimates of the share of the population affected.

 

1.         Safety Net Programs

 

Except for retirement programs, safety net programs are used when a bad event happens—e.g., lack of employment, illness, death in the family, etc. Most government programs have means tests with eligibility standards set to include all of those with family incomes up to 185 percent of the poverty line.[8] For a family of three, this would be slightly below $30,000. Assuming that prime earner brought in $25,000 of this income, that would put his hourly wage at $12, which is two and half times the minimum wage.

 

It is important to note that people’s circumstances change from year to year. In quantitative analysis reported below, 15-year average incomes will be reported. Over this period, most people will have several years with incomes 25 percent below and 25 percent above their average. In other words, those with long-term average incomes of $40,000 will have several years in which they would be eligible for safety net programs and several years in which they are making considerably above $40,000. Even though some people with incomes above this level will have an odd year every now and then in which they utilize a safety net program, the vast majority of usage is concentrated in those with long-run average incomes below $40,000 a year.[9] 

 

2.    People in families above $40,000 cut-off

 

It is reasonable to argue that a person does not need to utilize a program to benefit from it. This factor is based on the same one behind all insurance policies in which people regularly pay relatively small sums to offset the risk of a potentially large loss in some point in the future. This issue may be particularly important in the modern era where corporate outsourcing, downsizing and restructuring are more prevalent, leading some to talk about the problems facing an “anxious class.” [10]

 

Even among those affected by adverse economic events, it is necessary to know by how much are they affected. For example, if family’s income declines from $70,000 a year to $50,000 a year, this has a significant effect on their living standards.[11] But does this negative experience change these people’s views towards safety net programs? Without data to answer this question, one can not definitely answer this question. At $50,000 a year, they are still above qualifying for most safety net programs, and it is certainly not clear that this experience would automatically change political views.

 

I am unconvinced that the insurance aspect of safety net programs animates these people. Even though people in families earning $40,000 to $70,000 are more likely than their higher income counterparts to empathize with those earning less, they do not easily fall into any group and should not considered as having strong economic interests with the Democrats. In a society that glorifies consumption, they are aware that others have more. Households in this income range often are home owners but don’t live in the best areas. Without much savings, they worry about job losses and unexpected medical expenses. Yet, they can have dense social networks and feel that they are solidly middle class. These “Reagan Democrats” may resent the advantages accorded the elite but also worry that government has coddled too many poor people and is inefficient with their spending.  

 

3. Estimating the number of people in each group

 

Determining how many people fall into various income groups is actually quite difficult and requires many methodological choices. First, there are life cycle effects. For example, when graduate students (or other young workers) have low incomes, this condition is temporary and their perceived interests are rooted more in the expectations of where they will be rather than where they are at the moment. Second, there is a lot of yearly fluctuation. Every researcher who has used data that follow the same people over a span of many years (called longitudinal panels) reports their surprise at the size of these fluctuations. These yearly movements increase the number of observations at high and low incomes in a single year relative to long-term averages. The third issue has to do with measuring change over time, which can only be done properly by following the same people over time.[12]

 

The approach used here tracks family incomes over 15 years for people in their prime-earning years. These numbers should not be considered precise but taken as order of magnitude figures. This is especially true because the best data source for this approach only has usable data through 1998.[13] Over the 15-year study period, the average annual family income for prime-age adults was $66,000 for males and $61,000 (1999 dollars) for females.[14]

 

As Table 1 shows, 8 percent of males and 14 percent of females were at or below the long-term “minimum-income” cutoff of $25,000. The next income category, some might use the term “working poor,” goes through $37,500 (not far from $40,000 in inflation adjusted dollars) and contained another 12 percent of prime-age adults. Thus, the combined total of the poor and working poor was 19 percent of males and 27 percent of females.[15] The next group runs through $50,000 in 1999 dollars and included another 16 percent of prime-age adults.

 

These numbers provide a basis for estimating the size of the group with economic interests aligned with Democratic Party based on living standards. If the narrow definition of including only the first two groups is used, then the numbers of 19 percent of males and 27 percent of females are probably much smaller than most progressive commentators would estimate. It is also a number that you would not see commonly cited because most researchers and commentators use data from a single year surveys in their analyses and include the entire population rather than just prime-age people. While this choice is appropriate for many analyses, using it in this context overstates the share of the population with lower incomes, such that a one-year estimate of the share of households with incomes under $40,000 would be over 40 percent.

 

 

 

Table 1: Average Family Incomes, 1983-1998
Adults 26-59 Years Old
Incomes in 1999 dollars	Total	Men	Women
$25,000 or less	11	8	14
$25,-37,500	12	11	13
$37,500-$50,000	16	15	17
$50,-75,000	30	33	28
$75,000 and higher	30	33	28
Source: Author’s calculations from the PSID. Numbers don’t add to 100 because of rounding

 

 

4. Jobs in the New Economy and Who benefits from curbing corporate power

 

There have been many claims about the declining number of good jobs: As the share of manufacturing jobs has continuously declined over the last 40 years, many people have the perception that the new service economy is composed primarily of low-paying jobs in retailing and low-skilled services. Yet, this shrinkage in the number of good jobs occurred during a period when there has been a massive upgrading in the education credentials of the work force. In 1960, fully one-half of the labor force did not possess a high school diploma; only twenty percent had some postsecondary schooling. Today, just over 10 percent of workers do not have a HS diploma or GED certificate, while the share with at least some college is just below 60 percent. In addition, since 1979, the relative earnings of college graduates to high school graduates have increased greatly.

 

Things don’t seem to add up—more educated workers yet fewer good jobs. Either low-skill jobs are being filled with overqualified workers (which is inconsistent with the change in relative earnings), or there is a misconception about the nature of employment in the non-manufacturing sector.[16] In order to understand the nature of the new services, I developed an approach based on five functional activities that are defined by the nature of the work that people do.[17] The “Office sector” is the largest group and is composed of private and public administrative workers, sales representatives (not sales clerks), and employees in finance, insurance and related business services. In addition to the office sector, the other divisions of the economy are: direct producers in primary production (agriculture, mining, and wood products), manual workers in factories, construction, utilities, transportation, and wholesale trade (not including the front office workers), non-administrative workers in health and education, and low skilled personal services and retail workers.

 

By tracking these changes in economy from 1959 to 2003, the following trends were found (see Table 2):

• The share decline in the manufacturing and related employment from 34 percent of the labor force to 16 percent;
• The rise in the office sector from 30 to 43 percent of workers;
• The rise in the relative pay and educational background of office workers, such that workers in this sectors now receive half of all pay in the economy;
• Although high technology has grown, workers in science, computers, and related fields still only account for 7-8 percent of employment (data not shown in Table 2); and
• The stability in the size of the low-skilled service sector.

 

Table 2: Employment Shares, 1959 and 2003, Five Functional Areas
	1959	2003	Change
Farm/Extractive Production	4.7	1.5	-3.2
Factory and Related Production	33.5	15.8	-17.7
Low-skill Sales and Service	20.5	20.2	-0.3
Health Care and Education	10.9	19.0	8.1
Office Administration and Business Services	30.4	43.5	13.1
Source: Author's Calculations from CPS and 1960 Census

 

Accompanying these changes has been a massive increase in the credentials needed for all jobs. Formerly, factory, craft, police, and related jobs did not even require a high school diploma; now workers are expected to have at least finished HS and preferably a couple of years of college. Insurance agents and low- to mid-level management often had not received a bachelor’s degree; today, this is rare and many of these workers have some post-graduate education. Within each of these jobs, those with higher education credentials earn considerably more than those without these accomplishments.

 

In a parallel analysis to this functional division of the economy, I divided occupations into three broad groupings[18]:

• Managerial and Professional (Elite Jobs)
• Supervisors, craft workers, technicians, clerical workers, police and firefighters (Good Jobs)
• Operative, salesclerks, service workers, and farm and non-farm laborers (Less-Skilled Jobs).

 

In each of these three tiers, there is a gender segregation of men’s and women’s jobs; therefore all of the analysis followed male and female workers separately. In 1959, for example, among prime-age (30 to 59 years old) male workers, the division among elite, good, and less-skilled jobs was 20 percent, 39 percent, and 41 percent. In 2000, this had shifted to 34 percent, 38 percent, and 29 percent.[19]

 

In other words, there has been a large increase in the number of the best-paying jobs with the share of the upper tier growing by 14 percentage points, the share of middle tier remaining almost constant, and the share in the lower tier declining by 12 percentage points. Contrary to what some on the left might think, the share of bad jobs fell significantly as more workers with postsecondary education moved into an expanding set of managerial and professional jobs.

 

This discussion about the shift in functions to office activities and in occupations to more managerial and professional jobs is a quick overview of many complicated issues. Despite stories about downsizing, most college graduates become part of the middle layers of the corporate hierarchy (or work for business service companies that have corporations as their clients). These workers fill the downtown and suburban offices during the day and return to their suburban homes at night. It may seem counterintuitive that we can function with so much “overhead” activities. But this is the consequence of increasing productivity that has required meant fewer workers to produce our food and other consumer goods. 

 

In this approach, just 18 percent of male workers and 7 percent of female workers are part of the “industrial proletariat.” Using a broader measure which includes blue collar workers in transportation, utilities and wholesale as well as manufacturing, brings the share up to 34 percent of male workers and 10 percent of female workers. In comparison, about 35 percent of male and female workers have high-end managerial and professional jobs. 

 

So, who has “objective interests” in curbing corporate power? On some levels, the 80 percent of workers that are not self-employed or in management don’t control their working conditions and want protections. On other levels, workers have interests in common with their employers because the success of their company is necessary for them to keep their jobs. Finally, in today’s world, there is a body of laws already in place, and the key issues revolve around enforcement and either expanding or contracting various regulations.

 

Key work place issues include minimal wage legislation, forced overwork, occupational health and safety, right to unionize, unemployment benefits, and retraining services. For most of these issues, there is soft public support. Despite the best efforts of many, these issues have not resonated widely nor rallied strong enough support to win. Each campaign could be carefully assessed and evaluated in terms of mistakes made. Or, we could look at the structural changes described here and our level of development as not providing the fertile conditions of common solidarity for these movements to win.[20]

 

5.   The impact of other public sector activities

 

As the government has grown in size and importance, its direct and indirect impacts are enormous—over 30 percent of GDP is spent by the combined public sector and more than one in six workers are public employees. All of this effort clearly produces a lot of services—e.g., education, transportation, sanitation, defense, etc.—that are benefit the whole population. In order to support this system, a variety of taxes (with an array of different rate structures) are collected. In many cases, legislators have used the tax code to encourage various activities through special rates and exemptions—for example, the write-offs for home ownership are much larger in terms of lost federal taxes than the direct public expenditures for providing assistance for low-income families.

 

Therefore, it is important to realize that fights over public actions encompass considerably more than disagreements over the size of the transfer and regulatory functions. This leads to all kinds of contradictory feelings to collective activities. First, there are the benefits that one derives from all of these services. Second, there are a lot of public expenditures and activities that one does not support. Third, periodic dissatisfaction with a government bureaucracy or stories about public waste leads to frustrations and dissatisfaction. Fourth, there is the sense that someone else is not paying their fair share and that you are being overtaxed.

 

Many people believe that those who benefit from one type of government protection will support others seeking assistance. Yet forming coalitions on the basis of trading support has not always been successful. As many have noted, the blue states pay more into the federal government than they get in return as federal expenditures, while the opposite is the case in the red states. The agricultural sector, in particular, has been highly subsidized and protected, while people in rural areas have been one of the most consistent supporters of Republican candidates.

 

The density and complexity of people’s interactions with public programs can lead to different levels of public support. In many European countries, social democratic policies have a long history and enjoy widespread public support. Even when conservative governments are elected, the policies are maintained and only changed at the margins. In the US, government support was highest in the Roosevelt years and the year that followed. However, over the last 40 years, there has been a sustained attack (with little defense from the Democrats) on public programs. These attacks have undermined respect for all major institutions and created a poor environment for progressive ideas to flourish. 

 

The most successful progressive policies have been Social security and Medicare, which represent a large transfer to non-working retirees. However, these programs have certain unique features. First, they have been presented as being more like a pension that was “earned.” Second, the elderly are particularly “deserving” beneficiaries. They are hardly shirkers and have limited options to support themselves. And, in all societies, respecting the elderly is an important value. Third, social security recipients over the previous 30 years received benefits far in excess to what any pension would have paid. This generosity was based on the strong economic growth from 1945 through 1973 and a relatively small elderly cohort. Consequently, the combination of experiencing depression and war and then prosperity and expanding benefits created very positive feelings to these programs. 

 

The experiences of the current and soon-to-be retirees are not the same. Their connection to the Democratic golden years from FDR to LBJ is much more tenuous; the demographics are not as favorable; and benefits cannot grow at the same rate. Further, the attacks on public spending in general and on the viability of the retirement program in particular have raised some doubts about the future of these programs. Nonetheless, these programs remain popular as one of the signature public sector achievements. 

 

The bottom line is that coalitions to support progressive public policies need to be built and do not coalesce automatically. During times of steep economic slumps, it is easier for many to see the need for a broad public safety net. In countries with a long history of solidarity between social groups, left wing parties have a broad base and had long periods as the ruling party. Even when these parties are not in power, conservatives do not cut back safety net programs because of their popular support.

 

However, the American experience shows that it is also possible for parochial interests to rule. In these circumstances, those who have been most supportive of progressive initiatives have been lower income people and the labor movement. The former group utilizes safety net programs regularly and the latter group relies on the curbing-of-corporate-power roles of government. By and large, labor leaders, especially of industrial unions, have also understood for the need to build broad support for activist public policies and have been some of the most consistent supporters of safety-net programs.

 

 

Issue Framing in the last election

 

Left critics of Kerry argue that he did not run enough as a populist to delineate clearly his differences from Bush. In terms of economic policy, the critique is that he did not emphasize things like tax cuts tilted heavily to the rich, health care, the ruinous consequence of unbridled globalization, increasing the minimal wage, and workers rights issues (e.g., to unionize, protections against capricious firings, and setting minimum health, safety, and pension standards). Finally, not tying Bush to the corporate scandals and obscene CEO salaries is viewed as a crucial missed opportunity.

 

Looking quickly at each of these issues separately reveals some of the reasons why Kerry did not (or could not) make these issues more salient. It certainly clear that the Bush team was ready for this assault and would have responded with claims that Kerry was making tired appeals to “class warfare”, reflecting a backward way of responding to modern problems that appealed only to “special interests.”

 

1. Tax Cuts

 

Progressives have cited many statistics showing that the Republican tax cuts over Bush’s first four years were skewed to the upper income tax payers. Each of these claims is made with a tone of righteous indignation, waiting for the people to punish those who passed these laws. Alas, the response has been tepid and does not particularly expand the base. Differential tax cuts did not have that strong an effect because low- and middle-income people don’t see the huge tax refunds for the rich as money coming out of their pocket. Kerry tried in vain to make an issue of what the programs could be funded if the tax cut for families over $200,000 was rescinded. Bush disingenuously said these tax cuts created jobs by helping small business owners. A rising deficit is too abstract to have much immediate political effect because the federal government has run deficits for virtually all of the last 40 years without having a consistent effect on jobs and the economy. And as polls on estate taxes show, citizens feel that taxes are too high across the board and seem willing to apply a principle of fairness when evaluating taxes that don’t even apply to them.  

 

 2. Health Care 

 

The politics of health care is another issue that progressives seem to have public support for change. While liberals think that having more than 45 million people being uninsured is a travesty, it still means that over 80 percent of the population does have coverage. A lot of people rotate in and out of jobs with coverage, and a number of people choose not to enroll in plans that require significant personal contributions. They do this thinking that they are healthy and might not get sick and knowing that, as a last resort, they can show up at hospital emergency rooms and get treated.[21]

 

As the Clintons found out, this is a mine field with few easy solutions. Basically, polls show that the public wants more care, faster access, better care, and lower prices. Any reference to the success of universal plans in other countries is usually discounted. Politicians that have tried to reform the system have usually ended up adding more benefits for patients and controls of reimbursements for providers. Concerns for the uninsured can not lead anywhere without more systematic reforms, and hence this issue continually fails to be resolved. The Democratic edge in public opinion polls on health care is somewhat illusory because each specific policy initiative has much less support.

 

3. Globalization:

 

With respect to international trade, office, health care, and educational workers have only been marginally affected. In many ways, they have benefited from lower prices for many standard goods and high quality for some other purchases. The argument that increasing globalization always leads to job losses and earnings declines is not supported by history or economic theory.[22] Because displaced workers are deserving victims (the played by the rules), there is sympathy for their plight, that is tempered by wariness of a heavy public hand.

 

There is public anger at companies that move facilities overseas, but not much support for any laws that would impede this action. In the same vein, there have been calls to “buy American” that may have had some effect. Fears about a potential backlash caused many foreign auto producers to locate facilities here; in addition, there have been various tariffs and trade limitations imposed on foreign products. These actions, however, have been inconsistent and often driven by very parochial concerns of local interests. Kerry tried to make this an issue, but it had relatively little traction with few people thinking that the Democrats had a good plan to reverse the negative consequences of globalism. Most politicians rhetorically support “fair trade” over “free trade” and end up doing very little.

 

4. Supporting Worker’s Rights

 

It should be clear by now, that the data presented earlier show why these appeals have limited direct support. For example, on worker’s safety issues, very few voters are likely to be swayed by the Republican inaction on ergonomic standards. Many people will support worker’s rights policies because they think that other people need these benefits rather than because it would benefit them.

 

Conclusion

 

This article has been directed at looking at economic interests, trying to define them and trying to estimate the share of the population with economic interests aligned with the Democrats. If the number is as small as is indicated here, then one can’t argue that the majority have a natural home in the Democrat Party. Once this premise is dropped, another series of propositions lose much of their cogency:

• People are ill-informed;
• The media has obfuscated the truth;
• Politicians are willing to lose votes in order to satisfy their donors; and
• Political consultants (only Democratic ones) have led candidates to take losing positions.

 

Abandoning these premises would actually be very good for liberals. Many of them are arrogant, off-putting sentiments that have been successfully ridiculed by conservatives for their elitism. In addition, these easy answers inhibit creative analyses and the search for policies that will be support by the majority of the population.  Without the crutch that the majority starts out on our side, we will be forced to face hard choices.

 

The problem for liberals can be summed up in one set of numbers: according to exit polls, the self-proclaimed ideological positions of voters were 34 percent conservative, 21 percent liberal, and 45 percent moderate.[23] Kerry actually won the moderates by over 8 percentage points but lost the election because this victory was not large enough to offset the 13 percent point conservative advantage.

 

The liberal-conservative division is actually quite muddy because there are so many possible defining issues: economic (taxes, regulation, international trade), social (abortion, gay rights, etc.) and security/international relations. In addition, the women’s rights and environmental movements don’t fit neatly into any of the above three areas. The bottom line is that there are few people who either are liberal or conservative across all of these issues. Most people are hybrids of one type or another, have weak party identification, and often split their ticket by voting for candidates of different parties for different offices.

 

Liberals have a dilemma that no amount of parsing is going to help them avoid. Rightly, they are associated with public policies that support those that are less well-off, those that have faced discrimination, and those who feel the current system needs to be changed. While this is admirable, it has had the unexpected consequence of making the party seem a group of interest groups.[24]

 

Liberals have relied on its identification with the “little guy” to be a unifying force based on a common self-interest. The data that are presented in this article would suggest that the number of people that directly benefit from activist state welfare policies is less than one quarter of the population. Other sectors of the population (e.g, college educated and young) have sympathies for redistributive and other progressive policies on the basis of moral values. But the support of many of these people for Democrats is not strong, and they can be swayed by fiscal and security concerns as well as various social issues. This is particularly true in light of the Republican’s four decade ideological assault on big government (‘wastes your money’), individualism (‘keep your money’), and covert racism (‘even if you want to help the poor in general, you don’t want to help welfare cheats of color’).

 

Clinton, the triangulator, tried to balance these competing interests with a “tough love” approach that included welfare reform. He was fortunate to initially run when the economy was weak and security concerns were low. He was fortunate again when, combined with some good fiscal policies, the economy went through a growth spurt while he was in office. But, even before he squandered his popularity with his personal problems, Clinton was not popular with the left wing of the party and did not prevent Congressional Democrats from losing control of both houses.

 

Liberals cringe at the thought that Clintonism represents the “left wing of the possible.” Kevin Mattson concludes his article about past and future liberalism talking about “shared national purpose,” “shared obligations”, and “shared sacrifices”.[25] This is a vocabulary of people doing things for others because it is right rather than because it is in their narrow economic self-interest.[26]

 

In western European countries, social democratic parties are rooted in 100 years of activism and have a reservoir of support. The positive feelings towards the FDR Democratic Party are much weaker, and this is going to have to change if American liberalism is going to gain strength. It will not be an easy road and will need some very talented politicians to articulate a vision that resonates widely. It will also require some painful compromises that will alienate powerful constituencies. But we will not know how to make these arguments and compromises if we begin thinking the majority is already on our side.