It would be hard to find a Democrat right now who doesn't think that the attacks during August by the Swift Boat critics were extremely damaging to John Kerry and that a much earlier and more combative response to the accusations would have substantially reduced their impact. With reports of new smear attacks on the horizon, many democrats consider the two generalizations above as the unquestioned basis for planning the democratic response.

But, surprisingly, the evidence for both of these conclusions is not as clear as it might seem. The analyses that have advanced this view have generally said something like the following: "Well, Kerry's poll support fell during August and the Swift Boat attacks were the biggest news story that month so the one must have caused the other"

For example, Newsweek's summary of its most recent poll argued,
Kerry's campaign, on the other hand, may have been hurt by the television ad campaign launched against him by Vietnam veterans who question his record. Just 45 percent of all voters view Kerry favorably (down from 53 percent in late July) and 46 percent view him unfavorably (up from 37 percent).

This direct jump from the swift boat ads to the level of Kerry's popularity is, to put it mildly, a pretty breathtaking leap of statistical inference (and one that is probably not a good idea to try out in Stat 101). But, if you look closely, many commentators argue along pretty much the same kinds of lines.

Commentators get away with this kind of "seat of the pants" thinking because, like most people, they rely heavily on gut, instinct and experience to reach conclusions and frequently use polling data more like decoration for their ideas then as actual proof.

But if Democrats want to make serious use of public opinion data in planning their political strategy, they need to begin by examining the data in a different way, focusing on results that can actually inform choices between alternative strategies.

In the case of the swift boat ads there are three key questions a practical political strategist would want answered: how effective actually was the attack, how much of an effect did the delayed response of the Kerry campaign have, and what impact, if any, did the attacks and the controversy have on the image and reputation of Bush and the Republican party.

1. How effective were the ads?

On the first question - how successful were the attacks - it is important to distinguish between public opinion about Kerry's participation in the anti-war movement after he returned from Vietnam and the specific challenges the Swift Boat critics raised about his military service. As noted previously, Kerry's anti-war activities during the early 1970's had always been certain to anger and alienate a significant number of veterans and families of men who had died in Vietnam. According to an August 23-26 poll by the Annenberg Center for Public Policy, some 60% of the veterans who were familiar with John Kerry's anti-war statements disapproved of them.

But in regard to the specific allegations raised by the Swift Boat critics that Kerry did not actually deserve his medals, the Annenberg study found that only 24% of the sample agreed in contrast to 55% who thought Kerry did indeed deserve them. In fact, even a majority of traditionally conservative groups such as men and veterans agreed with Kerry rather then his critics on this issue. It was only among Republican partisans and in the closed conservative media environment created by talk radio and cable TV that the percentage of those who thought Kerry did not deserve his medals ever rose above 30%.

Even after the Republican convention this negative view of the ads has persisted. In a Sept 3-5 Gallup survey, only 21% of the respondents felt the ads were "generally accurate" in contrast to 40% who felt that they "distort the truth" (another 40% were either unfamiliar with the issue or had not formed an opinion)

It is unquestionably disturbing that the Fox/Talk Radio/Republican Party media machine can convince 20% of the American people of charges that are rejected by most other Americans. But, while the attacks clearly twisted media coverage of Kerry in a negative direction during August and prevented Kerry from focusing attention on "his" issues, as an attempt to actually damage John Kerry's image and reputation with voters outside the loyal Republican base, the data from the Annenberg survey (and other polls as well) indicate that the smear campaign was essentially a failure.

2. Would a faster response by the Kerry campaign have prevented the smear from taking hold?

The Annenberg survey also calculated day by day data during mid-August which showed that the number of people who doubted that Kerry deserved his medals gradually rose from about 20% on August 10, when the advertisements had been in the news for about 6 days, up to 30% by August 18th when the Kerry campaign first forcefully responded. After that, the percentage of doubters then sank back down to about 20% by August 26th as an increasing number of eyewitnesses, documents and editorials in major newspapers appeared supporting Kerry's version of events.

Given the 10% decline in the percentage of people who doubted Kerry's earned his medals that occurred once the Kerry campaign and the media began firmly challenging the attacks, it would indeed appear that an earlier response might have prevented the smear from gaining traction in the first place. But, before accepting this conclusion it is necessary to consider that significant sympathy for Kerry was created by the perception that he had been the victim of a two-week long, totally one-sided attack. Had the Kerry campaign responded furiously to the charges the same day they were launched, the counterattack would almost certainly have been spun by the critics as an attempt to "hide the truth" "create a cover-up", "bully Vietnam veterans" or "prevent an honest debate". This accusation, in turn, would then have been used to demand that the mainstream media criticize both camps for "negative politics" rather then just the Republicans and could easily have weakened the very categorical rejection of the accusations that finally appeared in the editorial comments of major newspapers like the L.A. Times and Chicago Tribune.

This does not mean that the slow response of the Kerry campaign was the right strategy. But it does illustrate that, in responding to smears, there are often significant trade-off's between conflicting objectives that have to be taken into consideration.

3. Did the controversy damage the Republican Party's image and reputation?

Regarding this final issue, the Annenberg study found in late August that 46% of the respondents believed the Bush campaign was behind the ads, in contrast to 37% who did not. By the time of the Republican convention an increasing perception of the party's behavior as generally unfair had clearly taken hold. In the September 3-5 Gallup poll noted above, a majority of 52% of the respondents felt that Republicans had "attacked John Kerry unfairly" in contrast to only 42% who did not. (The democrats, in contrast, were seen by most voters as not having attacked Bush unfairly). Similarly, 50% of the Gallup sample felt the Republicans had spent too much time criticizing the Democrats during the convention in contrast to only 39% who thought they had maintained the right balance.

Lessons for next time

There are several conclusions suggested by this data, conclusions that go beyond the currently popular view that democrats should respond to any future smear attacks as rapidly, forcefully and aggressively as possible.

First, it is probably impossible to prevent smears from taking hold within the conservative "echo chamber" of Fox and talk radio and it may be a misuse of resources to attempt to achieve that goal. The more important and achievable goal - preventing the smear from spreading beyond that audience - is probably best pursued by energetically demanding that the mainstream media fulfill their journalistic obligations by emphatically and categorically labeling false accusations as baseless on their editorial pages rather then attempting to debate the issues directly with the smear group itself.

Second, while a very rapid and aggressive response to new accusations can clearly be desirable, it must still be balanced with the need to appear fair, unruffled and unafraid of open and honest debate. A shrill or intemperate counterattack, even if launched at the earliest possible moment, can have little effect or even be counterproductive.

Finally, Republicans have significantly damaged their image and reputation among many moderates and opinion leaders by embracing an essentially dishonest, "win at any cost" approach during this campaign. This tarnished reputation is an asset democrats should energetically exploit. Not only does it reduce the appeal and legitimacy of Republicanism in general, but it makes it easier for Dems to successfully deflect future smear campaigns. Ronald Reagan's famous response, "There you go again", with which he portrayed Jimmy Carter's repeated challenges to his character as tiresome evidence of unfairness, provides one model of how such a strategy can be successfully executed.